We study conditional computational entropy: the amount of randomness a distribution appears to have to a computationally bounded observer who is given some correlated information. By considering conditional versions of HILL entropy (based on indistinguishability from truly random distributions) and Yao entropy (based on incompressibility), we obtain:
Introduction
The various information-theoretic definitions of entropy measure the amount of randomness a probability distribution has. As cryptography is able to produce distributions that appear, for computationally bounded observers, to have more randomness than they really do, various notions of computational entropy attempt to quantify this appearance of entropy. The commonly used HILL entropy (so named after [HILL99] ) says that a distribution has computational entropy k if it is indistinguishable (in polynomial time) from a distribution that has information-theoretic entropy k. 1 The so-called Yao entropy [Yao82, BSW03] , says that a distribution has computational entropy k if it cannot be efficiently compressed to below k bits and then efficiently decompressed. Other computational notions of entropy have been considered as well [BSW03, HILL99] .
Computational notions of entropy are useful, in particular, for extracting strings that are pseudorandom (i.e., look uniform to computationally bounded observers) from distributions that appear to have entropy. Indeed, generation of pseudorandom bits is the very purpose of computational entropy defined in [HILL99] , and its variant considered in [GKR04] . Pseudorandom bits have many uses, for example, as keys in cryptographic applications.
The adversary in cryptographic applications (or, more generally, an observer) often possesses information related to the distribution whose entropy is being measured. For example, in the case of Diffie-Hellman key agreement [DH76] the adversary has g x and g y , and the interesting question is the amount of computational entropy of g xy . Thus, the entropy of a distribution for a particular observer (and thus the pseudorandomness of the extracted strings) depends on what other information the observer possesses. Because notions of computational entropy necessarily refer to computationally-bounded machines (e.g., the distinguisher for the HILL entropy or the compressor and decompressor for the Yao entropy), they must also consider the information available to these machines. This has sometimes been done implicitly (e.g., in [GKR04] ); however, most commonly used definitions do not do so explicitly.
In this work, we explicitly put forward notions of conditional computational entropy. This allows us to:
1. Separate conditional Yao entropy from conditional HILL entropy by demonstrating a joint distribution (X, Z) such that X has high Yao entropy but low HILL entropy when conditioned on Z.
2. Demonstrate (to the best of our knowledge, first) application of Yao entropy by extracting more pseudorandom bits from a distribution using Yao-entropy-based techniques than seems possible from HILL-entropy-based techniques.
3. Define a new, natural notion of unpredictability entropy, which can be used, in particular, to talk about the entropy of a value that is unique, such as g xy where g x and g y are known to the observer, and possibly even verifiable, such as the preimage x of a one-way permutation f , where y = f (x) is known to the observer.
HILL-Yao Separation. The first contribution (Section 3) can be seen as making progress toward the open question of whether Yao entropy implies HILL entropy, attributed in [TVZ05] to Impagliazzo [Imp99] (the converse is known to be true: HILL entropy implies Yao entropy, because compressibility implies distinguishability). Wee [Wee04] showed that Yao entropy does not imply HILL entropy in the presence of a random oracle and a membership testing oracle. Our separation of conditional Yao entropy from conditional HILL entropy can be seen as an improvement of the result of [Wee04] : it shows that Yao entropy does not imply HILL entropy in the presence of a (short) random string, because the distribution Z on which X is conditioned is simply the uniform distribution on strings of polynomial length. The separation holds under the quadratic residuosity assumption.
Randomness Extraction. Usually, pseudorandomness extraction is analyzed via HILL entropy, because distributions with HILL entropy are indistinguishable from distributions with the same statistical entropy, and we have tools (namely, randomness extractors [NZ96] ) to obtain uniform strings from the latter. Tools are also available to extract from Yao entropy: namely, extractors with a special reconstruction property [BSW03] . Our second contribution (Section 4) is to show that considering the Yao entropy and applying a reconstructive extractor can yield many more pseudorandom bits than the traditional analysis, because, according to our first result, Yao entropy can be much higher than HILL entropy. This appears to be the first application of Yao entropy, and also demonstrates the special power of reconstructive extractors. It is worth mentioning that while our separation of entropies is conditional, the extraction result holds even for the traditional (unconditional) notion of pseudorandomness. The analysis of pseudorandomness of the resulting string, however, relies on the notion of conditional entropy, thus demonstrating that it can be a useful tool even in the analysis of pseudorandomness of unconditional distributions.
Unpredictability Entropy. Unpredictability entropy is a natural formalization of a previously nameless notion that was implicitly used in multiple works.. Our definition essentially says that if some value cannot be predicted from other information with probability higher than 2 −k , then it has entropy k when conditioned on that information. For example, when a one-way permutation f is hard to invert with probability higher than 2 −k , then conditioned on f (x), the value x has entropy k. The use of conditional entropy is what makes this definition meaningful for cryptographic applications.
We demonstrate that almost k pseudorandom bits can be extracted from distributions with unpredictability entropy k, by showing that unpredictability entropy implies conditional Yao entropy, to which reconstruction extractors can be applied. Thus, unpredictability entropy provides a simple language that allows, in particular, known results on hardcore bits of one-way functions to be stated more generally.
We also prove other (fairly straightforward) relations between unpredictability entropy and HILL and Yao conditional entropies.
Definitions and Notation
In this section we recall the HILL and Yao definitions of computational entropy (or pseudoentropy) and provide the new, conditional definitions.
Notation. We will use n for the length parameter; our distributions will be on strings of length polynomial in n. We will use s as the circuit size parameter (or running time bound when dealing with Turing machines instead of circuits). To denote a value x sampled from a distribution X, we write x ← X. We denote by M (X) the probability distribution on the outputs of a Turing machine M , taken over the coin tosses (if any) of M and the random choice of the input x according to the distribution X. We use U n to denote the uniform distribution on {0, 1} n . For a joint distribution (X, Z), we write X z to denote the conditional distribution of X when Z = z; conversely, given a collection of distributions X z and a distribution Z, we use (X, Z) to denote the joint distribution given by
We may describe more complicated distributions by describing the sampling process and then the sampled outcome. For example, {a ← X; b ← X : (a, b)} denotes two independent samples from X, while {a ← X : (a, M (a, Y ))} denotes the distribution obtained by sampling X to get a, sampling Y to get b, running M (a, b) to get c, and outputting (a, c). Unconditional Computational Entropy. The min-entropy of a distribution X, denoted by H∞ (X), is defined as − log(max x Pr[X = x]). Although min-entropy provides a rather pessimistic view of a distribution (looking only at its worst-case element), this notion is useful in cryptography, because even a computationally unbounded predictor can guess the value of a sample from X with probability at most 2 − H∞(X) . Most results on randomness extractors are formulated in terms of min-entropy of the source distribution.
The first definition says that a distribution has high computational min-entropy if it is indistinguishable from some distribution with high statistical min-entropy. It can thus be seen as generalization of the notion of pseudorandomness of [Yao82] , which is defined as indistinguishability from uniform.
Y needs to be efficiently samplable; however, for our application, as well as for [BSW03] , samplability is not required.)
Another definition of computational entropy considers compression length. Shannon's theorem [Sha48] says that the minimum compression length of a distribution, by all possible compression and decompression functions, is equal to its average entropy (up to small additive terms). Yao [Yao82] proposed to measure computational entropy by imposing computational constraints on the compression and decompression algorithms. 2 In order to convert this into a worst-case (rather than average-case) metric similar to min-entropy, Barak et al. [BSW03] require that any subset in the support of X (instead of only the entire X) be hard to compress. 
Note that just like HILL entropy, for = 0 this becomes equivalent to min-entropy (this can be seen by considering the singleton set of the most likely element).
Conditional Computational Entropy. Before we provide the new conditional definitions of computational entropy, we need to consider the information-theoretic notion of conditional minentropy. Let (Y, Z) be a distribution. If we take the straightforward average of the min-entropies
] to be the conditional min-entropy, we will lose the relation between min-entropy and prediction probability, which is important for many applications (see e.g. Lemma 5 and Lemma 8).
For instance, if for half of Z, H∞ (Y z ) = 0 and the other half H∞ (Y z ) = 100, then, given a random z, Y can be predicted with probability over 1/2, much more than 2 −50 the average would suggest. A conservative approach, taken in [RW05] , would be to take the minimum (over z) of H∞ (Y z ). However, this definition may kill "good" distributions like Y z = U n for all z = 0 n and Y z = 0 n for z = 0 n ; although this problem can be overcome by defining a so-called "smooth" version [RW05, RW04], we follow a different approach. For the purposes of randomness extraction, Dodis et al. [DORS06] observed that because Z is not under adversarial control, it suffices that the average, over Z, of the maximum probability is low. They define average min-entropy:
. This definition averages prediction probabilities before taking the logarithm and ensures that for any predictor P ,
. It also ensures that randomness extraction works almost as well as it does for unconditional distributions; see Section 4.
Using this definition of conditional min-entropy, defining conditional HILL-entropy is straightforward.
Definition 3 (Conditional HILL entropy). For a distribution (X, Z), we say X has HILL entropy at least k conditioned on Z, denoted by H
For conditional Yao entropy, we simply let the compressor and decompressor have z as input.
Definition 4 (Conditional Yao entropy). For a distribution (X, Z), we say X has Yao entropy at least k conditioned on Z, denoted by H Yao ,s (X|Z) ≥ k, if for every pair of circuits c, d of total size s with the outputs of c having length ,
We postpone the discussion of unpredictability entropy until Section 5.
Asymptotic Definitions. All above definitions are with respect to a single distribution and fixed-size circuits. We are also interested in their asymptotic behaviors, so we consider distribution ensembles. In this case, everything is parameterized by n: X (n) , s(n), and (n). In such a case, whether circuits in our definitions are determined after n is chosen (the nonuniform setting), or whether an algorithm of running time s(n) is chosen independent of n (the uniform setting) makes a difference. We consider the nonuniform setting. We omit the subscripts s(n) and (n) when they "denote" any polynomial and negligible functions, respectively ( (n) is negligible if (n) ∈ n −ω(1) ). More precisely, we write
for all n, and for every polynomial s(n), there exists a negligible s (n) such that cdist s(n) (X (n) , Y (n) ) ≤ s (n). Similarly for the other definitions.
Separating HILL Entropy from Yao Entropy
In this section we construct a joint distribution (X, Z), 3 such that given Z, the distribution X has high Yao but low HILL entropy; namely,
. This is a separation of conditional HILL and Yao entropies. Since Z will be simply a polynomially long random string, this result can also be viewed as a separation of Yao entropy and HILL entropy in the Common Reference String (CRS) model. (In this model one assumes that a uniformly-distributed string of length q(n), for some fixed polynomial q, is accessible to everyone.)
Our construction uses a non-interactive zero knowledge proof system, so we describe it briefly in the following subsection.
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK)
NIZK was introduced by Blum et al. [BFM88, BDMP91] . For our purposes, a single-theorem variant suffices. Let λ be a positive polynomial and L ∈ NP be a language that has witnesses of length n for theorems of lengths (λ(n − 1), λ(n)]. (It is easier for us to measure everything in terms of witness length rather than the more traditional theorem length, but they are anyway polynomially related for the languages we are interested in.) NIZK works in the CRS model. Let q be a positive polynomial, and let the CRS be r ← U q(n) when witnesses are of length n. A NIZK proof system for L is a pair of polynomial-time Turing machines (P, V), called the prover and the verifier (as well as the polynomial q) such that the following three conditions hold.
1. Completeness: ∀φ ∈ L with NP witness w, if π = P(φ, w, r) is the proof generated by P, then
2. Soundness: Call r bad if ∃φ / ∈ L, ∃π , such that V(φ, π , r) = 1 (and good otherwise). Then Pr r←U q(n) [r is bad] is negligible in n.
3. Zero-knowledgeness: There is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine SIM called the simulator, such that ∀φ ∈ L and every witness w for φ,
For our analysis, we need two additional properties. First, we need the proofs π not to add too much entropy. For this, we use ideas on unique NIZK by Lepinski, Micali and shelat [LMS05] . We do not need the full-fledged uniZK system; rather, the single-theorem system described as the first part of the proof of [LMS05, Theorem 1] suffices (it is based on taking away most of the prover freedom for the single-theorem system of [BDMP91] ). The protocol of [LMS05] is presented in the public-key model, in which the prover generates the public key (x, y) consisting of an n-bit modulus x and n-bit value y ∈ Z * x . To make it work for our setting, we simply have the prover generate the public key during the proof and put it into π. Once the public key is fixed, the prover has no further choices in generating π, except choosing a witness w for φ ∈ L (note that this actually requires a slight modification to the proof of [LMS05] , which we describe in Appendix A).
The second property we need is that the simulated shared randomness R SIM is independent of the simulator input φ. It is satisfied by the [LMS05] proof system (as well as by the [BDMP91] system on which it is based).
The zero-knowledge property of the [LMS05] proof system is based on the following assumption (the other properties are unconditional).
Assumption 1 (Quadratic Residuousity [GM84] for Blum Integers). For all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms P , if p 1 and p 2 are random n/2-bit primes congruent to 3 modulo 4, y is a random integer between 1 and p 1 p 2 with Jacobi symbol y p 1 p 2 = 1, and b = 1 if y is a quadratic residue modulo p 1 p 2 and 0 otherwise, then |1/2 − Pr[P (y, p 1 p 2 ) = b]| is negligible in n.
The formal statement of the properties we need from [LMS05] follows.
Lemma 1 ([LMS05]+Appendix A). If the above assumption holds, then there exists an NIZK proof system for any language L ∈ NP with the following additional properties: (1) if r is good and φ has t distinct witnesses w, then the number of proofs π for φ that are accepted by V is at most t2 2n , and (2) the string R SIM output by the simulator is independent of the simulator input φ.
The Construction
Our intuition is based on the separation by Wee [Wee04] , who demonstrated an oracle relative to which there is a random variable that has high Yao and low HILL entropy. His oracle consists of a random length-increasing function and an oracle for testing membership in the sparse range of this function. The random variable is simply the range of the function. The ability to test membership in the range helps distinguish it from uniform, hence HILL entropy is low. On the other hand, knowing that a random variable is in the range of a random function does not help to compress it, hence Yao entropy is high.
We follow this intuition, but replace the length-increasing random function and the membership oracle with a pseudorandom generator and an NIZK proof of membership, respectively. Our distribution X consists of two parts: 1) output of a pseudorandom generator and, 2) an NIZK proof that the first part is as alleged. However, an NIZK proof requires a polynomially long random string (shared, but not controlled, by the prover and the verifier). So we consider the computational entropy of X, conditioned on a polynomially long random string r chosen from the uniform distribution Z = U q(n) .
Let G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} λ(n) , for some polynomial λ, be a pseudorandom generator (in order to avoid adding assumptions, we can build based on Assumption 1), and let ((P, V), q) be the NIZK proof system guaranteed by Lemma 1 for the NP language L = {φ | ∃α such that φ = G(α)}. Let Z = R = U q(n) . Our random variable X consists of two parts (G(U n ), π), where π is the proof, generated by P, that the first part is an output of G. More precisely, the joint distribution (X, Z) is defined as {α ← U n ; r ← U q(n) ; π ← P(G(α), α, r) : ((G(α), π), r)}. Note that because X contains a proof relative to the random string r, it is defined only after the value r of Z is fixed.
Lemma 2 (Low HILL entropy). H HILL (X|Z) < 3n + 1.
Proof. Suppose there is some collection {Y r } r∈Z for whichH ∞ (Y |Z) ≥ 3n + 1. We will show that there is a distinguisher that distinguishes (X, Z) from (Y, Z). In fact, we will use the verifier V of the NIZK proof system as a universal distinguisher, which works for every such Y . Let p(r) def = max y Pr[Y r = y] be the probability of most likely value of the random variable Y r . When r is good, the number of (φ, π) pairs for which V(φ, π, r) = 1 is at most 2 3n : the total number 2 n of witnesses times the number of proofs 2 2n for each witness. Now, parse y as a theoremproof pair. The number of y such that V(y, r) = 1 is at most 2 3n , and each of these y happens with probability at most p(r). Therefore, when r is good, Pr y←Yr [V(y, r) = 1] ≤ 2 3n p(r), by the union bound. Hence, for any r, Pr y←Yr [V(y, r) = 1 ∧ r is good] ≤ 2 3n p(r) (for good r this is the same as above, and for bad r this probability is trivially 0, because of the conjunction). Now consider running V on a sample from (Y, Z).
≤ negl(n) + 1 2 (the last inequality follows from the definition ofH
with advantage close to 1/2.
Lemma 3 (High Yao entropy). If Assumption 1 holds, then H
Proof. Let s(n) be a polynomial. The following two statements imply that under Assumption 1,
is negligible, by the triangle inequality.
1. cdist s(n) ((X, Z), SIM(G(U n ))) is negligible. Indeed, fix a seed α ∈ {0, 1} n for G, and let (X α , Z) = {r ← U q(n) ; π ← P(G(α), α, r) : ((G(α), π), r)}. By the zero-knowledge property, we know that cdist s(n) ((X α , Z), SIM(G(α))) is negligible. Since it holds for every α ∈ {0, 1} n , it also holds for a random α; we conclude that cdist s(n) ((X, Z), SIM(G(U n ))) is negligible.
By definition of s (n), if the compressor and decompressor c and d have total size t, then
where s = t+(size of circuit to check equality of strings of length |x|), because we can use d(c(·, ·), ·) together with the equality operator as a distinguisher. Let the output length of c be .
, because for every fixed z, x contains φ ∈ U λ(n) (because by Lemma 1, z is independent of φ in the NIZK system we use). Hence
For every polynomial t(n), the value s(n) is polynomially bounded, and therefore s (n) is negligible, so
Remark 1. In the previous paragraph, we could consider also the simulated proof π (recall x = (φ, π)) when calculating Pr (x,z)←SIM(U λ(n) ) [d(c(x, z), z) = x] for even higher Yao entropy. A simulated proof π contains many random choices made by the simulator. Although the simulator algorithm for [LMS05] is not precisely specified, but rather inferred from the simulator in [BDMP91] , it is quite clear that the simulator will get to flip at least three random coins per clause in the 3-CNF formula produced out of φ in the reduction to 3-SAT (these three coins are needed in order to simulate the location of the (0, 0, 0) triple [LMS05, proof of Theorem 1, step 9] among the eight triples). This more careful calculation of
will yield the slightly stronger statement H Yao (X|Z) ≥ λ(n) + 3γ(n), where γ(n) is the number of clauses in the 3-CNF formula. This more careful analysis is not needed here, but will be used in Section 4.3.
Since for any polynomial λ(n), we have pseudorandom generators of stretch λ, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 yield the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Separation). Under the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, for every polynomial λ, there exists a joint distribution ensemble (X
for some polynomial q(n).
Randomness Extraction
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main applications of computational entropy is the extraction of pseudorandom bits. Based on Theorem 4, in this section we show that the analysis based on Yao entropy can yield many more pseudorandom bits than the traditional analysis based on HILL entropy. Although Theorem 4 is for the conditional setting, we will see an example of extraction that benefits from the conditional-Yao-entropy analysis for the unconditional setting as well. Before talking about extracting pseudorandom bits from computational entropy, let us look at a tool for analogous task in the information-theoretic setting: an extractor takes a distribution Y of min-entropy k, and with the help of a uniform string called the seed, "extracts" the randomness contained in Y and outputs a string of length m that is almost uniform even given the seed. 1} d is a strong (k, ) -extractor if the last d outputs of bits of E are equal to the last d input bits (these bits are called seed ), and dist((E(X, U d ), U m × U d ) ≤ for every distribution X on {0, 1} n with H∞ (X) ≥ k. The number of extracted bits is m, and the entropy loss is k − m.
Definition 5 ([NZ96]). A polynomial-time computable function
There is a long line of research on optimizing the parameters of extractors: minimizing seed length, minimizing , and maximizing m. For applications of primary interest here-using extracted randomness for cryptography-seed length is less important, because strong extractors can use non-secret random seeds, which are usually much easier to create than the secret from which the pseudorandom bits are being extracted. It is more important to maximize m (as close to k as possible), while keeping negligible. 5
Extracting from Conditional HILL Entropy
It is not hard to see that applying an extractor on distributions with HILL entropy yields pseudorandom bits; because otherwise the extractor together with the distinguisher violate the definition of HILL entropy. We show the same for the case of conditional HILL entropy. We reiterate that in the conditional case, the variable Z is given to the distinguisher who is trying to tell the output of the extractor from random.
Hence, the extractor works as expected in all but δ fraction of the cases; that is, for all but δ fraction of z values,
because dist is bounded by 1. The desired result follows by triangle inequality.
Remark 2. The entropy loss of E is at least 2 log δ can be avoided for some specific E, such as pairwise-independent (a.k.a. strongly universal) hashing [CW79] , as shown in [DORS06, Lemma 4.2]; because pairwise-independent hashing has optimal entropy loss of 2 log 1 2 − 2, this gives us the maximum possible number of extracted bits. The loss of log 1 δ can be also avoided when min z∈Z H∞ (Y z ) ≥ k (as is the case in, e.g., [GKR04] ).
Using an extractor on distributions with HILL entropy (the method that we just showed extends to conditional HILL entropy) is a common method for extracting pseudorandom bits. HILL entropy is used, in particular, because it is easier to analyze than Yao entropy. In fact, in the unconditional setting, the only way we know how to show that a distribution has high Yao entropy (incompressibility) is by arguing that it has high HILL entropy (indistinguishability). Nevertheless, Barak et al. [BSW03] showed that some extractors can also extract from Yao entropy.
Extracting from Conditional Yao Entropy
Barak et al. [BSW03] observed that extractors with the so-called reconstruction procedure can be used to extract from Yao Entropy. Thus, Theorem 4 ( H Yao (X|Z) H HILL (X|Z)) suggests that such a reconstructive extractor with a Yao-entropy-based analysis may yield more pseudorandom bits than a generic extractor with a traditional HILL-entropy-based analysis. We begin with a definition from [BSW03] .
Definition 6 (Reconstruction procedure). An ( , )-reconstruction for a function E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m × {0, 1} d (where the last d outputs are equal to the last d inputs bits) is a pair of machines C and D, where C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is a randomized Turing machine, and D (·) : {0, 1} → {0, 1} n is a randomized oracle Turing machine which runs in time polynomial in n. Furthermore, for every x and
the probability is over the random choices of C and D).
Trevisan [Tre99] showed, implicitly, that any E with an ( , )-reconstruction is an ( + log 1 , 3 )-extractor, and Barak et al. [BSW03] showed that such extractors can be used to extract pseudorandom bits from distributions with Yao entropy. We extend the proof of Barak et al. so that their result holds for the conditional version of Yao entropy.
Lemma 6. Let X be a distribution with H Yao ,s (X|Z) ≥ k, and let E be an extractor with a
Proof. Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that there is a distinguisher T of size s such that
By the Markov inequality, there is a subset S in the support of (X, Z) such that Pr[(X, Z) ∈ S] ≥ 4 , and
, where the probability is over the random choices of C and D. Thus, there is a fixing of the random choices of C and D, denoted by circuitsC,D, such that
and d(y, z) =D T (·,z) (y) be the compression and decompression circuits, respectively. Then
The above lemma does not yield more pseudorandom bits when given a distribution that has high Yao but low HILL entropy, unless we have a reconstructive extractor with long output length (compared to generic extractors, which work for HILL entropy). Fortunately, there is a simple way to increase the output length of a reconstructive extractor, at the expense of increasing the seed length; namely, by applying the extractor multiple times on the same input distribution but each time with an independent fresh seed. Furthermore, there do exist reconstructive extractors; e.g., the Goldreich-Levin extractor: GL(x, y) def = (x · y) • y, where • denotes concatenation and · denotes inner product. Below, we describe more precisely how to increase the output length. For a proof, we refer the readers to Section 3.5 in the survey by Shaltiel [Sha02] . Proposition 1. Let GL : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} × {0, 1} n be an extractor with ( , ) reconstruction. Then E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} mn → {0, 1} m × {0, 1} mn defined below is an extractor with (m + , m )-reconstruction. Let • denote component-wise concatenation (i.e., to agree syntactically with the definition of extractor, we concatenate the 1-bit outputs and the n-bit seeds separately)
For the Goldreich-Levin extractor, = O(log 1 ). Then Lemma 6 implies that E extracts m pseudorandom bits out of any distribution that has Yao entropy m + + log 1 = m + O(log 1 ). This shows that it is possible to extract almost all of Yao entropy (e.g., if the negligible = 2 −polylog(n) suffices, then all but a polylogarithmic amount of entropy can be extracted). Using the distribution of Theorem 4, we can set = 2 −n to extract λ(n) − O(n) bits from X that are pseudorandom even given Z. This is more than the linear number of bits extractable from X using the analysis based on conditional HILL entropy.
Unconditional Extraction
In this subsection, let (X, Z) = ((G(U n ), Π), R) = {α ← U n ; r ← U q(n) ; π ← P(G(α), α, r) : ((G(α), π), r)} as defined in Section 3.2. The question is: how many pseudorandom bits can we extract from the unconditional distribution (X, Z)? Surprisingly, analysis based on conditional entropy yields more bits than unconditional analysis, demonstrating that the notion of conditional entropy may be a useful tool even in the analysis of pseudorandomness of unconditional distributions.
Analysis based on unconditional entropy. The straightforward way is to apply an extractor on (X, Z). This gives us almost k pseudorandom bits provided that H HILL (X, Z) ≥ k, or H Yao (X, Z) ≥ k for reconstructive extractors (see previous subsections). However, the best we can show is that H HILL (X, Z) = λ(n) + q(n) + O(n) (the analysis appears in Appendix B), and hence we cannot prove, using HILL entropy, that more than λ(n) + q(n) + O(n) bits can be extracted. On the other hand, we do not know if H Yao (X, Z) is higher; this is closely related to the open problem of whether HILL entropy is equivalent to Yao entropy, and appears to be difficult. 6 Thus, analysis based on unconditional entropy does not seem to yield more than λ(n) + q(n) + O(n) bits.
More bits from conditional Yao entropy. Analysis based on conditional HILL entropy seems to yield even fewer bits (see Lemma 2). But using conditional Yao entropy, we get the following result. Lemma 7. It is possible to extract 4λ(n) + q(n) − O(n) pseudorandom bits out of (X, Z).
Sketch. According to Remark 1 following Lemma 3, we can show that the conditional Yao entropy H Yao (X|Z) ≥ λ(n) + 3γ(n), where γ(n) is the number of clauses in the 3-CNF formula produced from φ in the reduction from L to 3-SAT. Since γ(n) ≥ λ(n), we can extract 4λ(n) − O(n) bits from X that are pseudorandom even given Z, by the last paragraph of Section 4.2. Noting that Z is simply a uniform string 7 , we can append it to the pseudorandom bits extracted from X and obtain an even longer pseudorandom string. Thus, we get 4λ(n) + q(n) − O(n) pseudorandom bits using the analysis based on conditional Yao entropy.
Unpredictability Entropy
In this section, we introduce a new computational entropy, which we call unpredictability entropy. Analogous to min-entropy, which is the logarithm of the maximum predicting probability, unpredictability entropy is the logarithm of the maximum predicting probability where the predictor is restricted to be a circuit of polynomial size. Note that in the unconditional setting, unpredictability entropy is just min-entropy; a small circuit can have the most likely value hardwired. In the conditional setting, however, this new definition can be very different from min-entropy, and in particular, allows us to talk about the entropy of a value that is unique, such as g xy where g x and g y are known to the observer, and possibly even verifiable, such as the preimage x of a one-way permutation f , where y = f (x) is known to the observer.
Definition 7 (Unpredictability entropy). For a distribution (X, Z), we say that X has unpredictability entropy at least k conditioned on Z, denoted by H unp ,s (X|Z) ≥ k, if there exists a collection of distributions Y z (giving rise to a joint distribution (Y, Z)) such that cdist s ((X, Z), (Y, Z)) ≤ , and for all circuits C of size s,
Remark 3. The parameter and the variable Y do not seem to be necessary in the definition; we can simply require Pr[C(Z) = X] ≤ 2 −k . However, they make this definition smooth [RW04] and easier to compare with existing definitions of HILL and Yao entropy. Remark 4. Note that our entropy depends primarily on the predicting probability, as opposed to on the size of the predicting circuit or the combination of both (see e.g., [TSZ01, HILL99] ). We choose to have s fixed, in order to accommodate distributions with nonzero information-theoretic entropy; otherwise the computational entropy of such distribution would be infinite because the predicting probability doesn't increase no matter how big the predicting circuit grows. For the case of one-way function, unpredictability entropy is what is often called "hardness." This notion is more general, and provides a simple language for pseudorandomness extraction: namely, a distribution with computational entropy k contains k pseudorandom bits that can be extracted (see below).
Relation to Other Notions and Bit Extraction
In this subsection we show that high conditional HILL entropy implies high unpredictability entropy, which in turn implies high conditional Yao entropy. Note that, assuming exponentially strong one-way permutations f exist, unpredictability entropy does not imply conditional HILL entropy: simply let (X, Z) = (x, f (x)). From Section 4, we know how to extract almost k bits from distributions with Yao entropy k, by using reconstructive extractors. Lemma 9 implies that the same method works for unpredictability entropy. Thus, the notion of unpredictability entropy allows for more general statements of results on hardcore bits (such as, for example, [GL89, TSZ01] ), which are usually formulated in terms of one-way functions. Most often these results generalize easily to other conditionally unpredictable distributions, for instance, the Diffie-Hellman distribution (g xy | g, g x , g y ). However, such generalization is not automatic, because a prediction of a one-way function inverse is verifiable (namely, knowing y, one can check if the guess for f −1 (y) is correct), while a guess of a value of a conditionally unpredictable distribution in general is not (indeed, the Diffie-Hellman distribution does not have it unless the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is easy). Thus, it would be beneficial if results were stated for the more general case of unpredictable distributions whenever such verifiability is not crucial. Unpredictability entropy provides a simple language for doing so. a shared random string r, and we can simply add strings r for which such an x exists to the set of bad strings (which will remain of negligible size).
B Unconditional HILL Entropy of (X, Z)
Recall that (X, Z) = ((G(U n ), Π), R) = {α ← U n ; r ← U q(n) ; π ← P(G(α), α, r) : ((G(α), π) , r)}. Below, we show that H HILL (X, Z) ≥ λ(n) + q(n) + O(n); it is unclear if higher HILL entropy can be shown. The discussion assumes some familiarity with the NIZK system for 3-SAT, by Lepinski, Micali, and shelat [LMS05] .
By the zero-knowledgeness, the output distribution (X SIM , Z SIM ) of the simulator is indistinguishable from (X, Z). So H HILL (X, Z) is no less than the min-entropy of (X SIM , Z SIM ). We count how many choices the simulator SIM has: there are,
• 2 λ(n) theorems to prove,
• fewer than 2 2n proving pairs to choose from (a proving pair is an n-bit Blum integer x and an n-bit quadratic residue y ∈ Z * x ),
• 2 q(n)−κ(n) choices for shared "random" string r, where κ(n) is the number of Jacobi symbol 1 elements of Z * x included in r (because in the simulated r, these elements must be quadratic residues in Z * x ),
• 2 κ(n) choices for claiming, in the simulated proof, whether each of the Jacobi symbol 1 elements in r is a quadratic residue or a quadratic nonresidue (the simulator gets to make false claims about that, because in the simulated r, they are all residues).
Taking the logarithm of the number of choices, we have H HILL (X, Z) ≥ λ(n) + q(n) + O(n). This seems to be the best we can do, as we do not know whether there are other distribution that is indistinguishable from (X, Z).
